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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] Bad facts make bad law.  The Supreme Court recently addressed 
the issue of what constitutes the appropriate standard of proof for 
invalidating an issued patent.1  The Patent Act provides a presumption of 
patent validity.2  Therefore, a party challenging a patent’s validity bears 
the burden of overcoming this presumption.3  However, the Patent Act is 
silent as to the standard of proof required to satisfy this burden.4  Despite 
the Act’s silence, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
                                                          
* John Morrissett is a patent agent and third year law student at the University of 
Richmond School of Law.  He would especially like to thank Professor Kristen Osenga 
for her invaluable guidance and assistance in publishing this article. 
 
1 See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2244 (2011). 
 
2 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006). 
 
3 Id. 
 
4 See B.D. Daniel, Heightened Standards of Proof in Patent Infringement Litigation: A 
Critique, 36 AIPLA Q.J. 369, 394 (2008) (“The statute is silent about the standard of 
proof.”).  See generally 35 U.S.C. § 282 (showing that the statute fails to provide a 
standard of proof to satisfy the burden of overcoming a patent's presumed validity). 
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(“Federal Circuit”) has consistently held that the Patent Act’s presumption 
of validity can only be overcome by a showing of clear and convincing 
evidence.5  Major players in the patent field, including Google, filed an 
amicus brief to the Supreme Court, arguing for the standard to be lowered 
to preponderance of the evidence.6  Despite the unusual facts of the case, 
the Supreme Court correctly chose not to lower the required standard of 
proof.7  While lowering the standard of proof has appeal in certain 
instances, it would damage the patent system and stifle innovation because 
the enforceability of a patent would remain questionable until litigation or 
beyond. 
 
[2] It is easier to understand the ripple effect resulting from a change 
to the standard of proof when considering the balance of interests behind 
that standard.  In exchange for a patent, an applicant must disclose his 
invention to society.8  Just as the invention must meet certain requirements 
to be worthy of receiving a patent, the associated patent protection must be 
                                                          
5 See, e.g., Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1573 
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (“Under 35 U.S.C. § 282, a patent is presumed valid, and the one 
attacking validity has the burden of proving invalidity by clear and convincing 
evidence.”); Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1360 (Fed. 
Cir. 1984) ("Neither does the standard of proof change; it must be by clear and 
convincing evidence or its equivalent, by whatever form of words it may be expressed." 
(citing Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng’g Labs., Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 8 (1934))). 
 
6 See Brief for Google, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 6, Microsoft, 
131 S. Ct. 2238 (No. 10-290), 2011 WL 380826. 
 
7 See Microsoft, 131 S. Ct. at 2252. 
 
8 See Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944) (“As a 
reward for inventions and to encourage their disclosure, the United States offers a 
seventeen-year monopoly to an inventor who refrains from keeping his invention a trade 
secret.  But the quid pro quo is disclosure of a process or device in sufficient detail to 
enable one skilled in the art to practice the invention once the period of the monopoly has 
expired; and the same precision of disclosure is likewise essential to warn the industry 
concerned of the precise scope of the monopoly asserted.”). 
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sufficient to incentivize disclosure by the applicant.9  While the strength of 
that protection is important, so is the reliability that a patent issued by the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) will be upheld as 
valid.10  Since the current standard of proof gives deference to the PTO’s 
decision to issue a valid patent, the standard increases the likelihood that a 
patent’s validity will be upheld during litigation.11  Lowering the standard 
of proof to a preponderance of the evidence would remove the deference 
given to the PTO, therefore making the enforceability of a patent suspect 
until its validity is upheld in litigation.  It makes sense for courts to give 
the PTO deference when determining patent invalidity based on prior art 
that the PTO has previously considered.12  However, when patent validity 
is challenged based on prior art that was not previously considered by the 
PTO, giving deference to the PTO may make less sense.  
 
[3] In the case before the Supreme Court, the PTO had not previously 
considered the new prior art.13  Microsoft contended that before litigation, 
i4i Limited Partnership (“i4i”) destroyed a computer software program 
                                                          
9 See MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., PATENT LAW IN A NUTSHELL 3 (2008) (discussing the 
patent system's creation of economic incentives to invent).  
 
10 See Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. United States, 372 F.2d 969, 978 (Ct. Cl. 
1967) (“It is just as important that a good patent be ultimately upheld as that a bad one be 
definitively stricken.”). 
 
11 See generally J. Michael Buchanan, Deference Overcome: Courts’ Invalidation of 
Patent Claims as Anticipated by Art Considered by the PTO, 2006 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 
2, ¶ 1 (2006) (explaining that a patent's presumption of validity is partly based on the 
patent examiner's consideration of prior art in granting the patent). 
 
12 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 
(1984) (declaring that reviewing courts will accept an agency’s reasonable interpretation 
of ambiguous statutes).  See generally Thomas Chen, Patent Claim Construction: An 
Appeal For Chevron Deference, 94 VA. L. REV. 1165, 1181-86 (2008) (arguing for 
Chevron deference to apply to patent claim construction, giving deference to the PTO 
when interpreting claims). 
 
13 See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2244 (2011). 
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called “S4.”14  According to Microsoft, this program would have rendered 
i4i’s patent invalid if it had been available as prior art.15  However, 
Microsoft was unable to proffer the destroyed program and therefore could 
not meet the clear and convincing standard.16  The only remaining 
evidence of the computer program was the testimony of a co-inventor of 
S4, who was a former i4i employee.17  The co-inventor testified about the 
content and function of S4.18  Microsoft also presented expert testimony 
about how, based on the co-inventor’s testimony, S4 taught some of the 
features of i4i’s U.S. Patent No. 5,787,449 (“the ‘449 patent”).19  
However, the sole testimony of an alleged co-inventor cannot meet the 
clear and convincing evidence standard.20  To successfully meet the 
standard, according to Microsoft, Microsoft needed to corroborate the 
alleged co-inventor’s testimony, but could not do so due to a lack of 
corroborating evidence as S4 had been destroyed.21  Microsoft contends 
                                                          
14 i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 589 F.3d 1246, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2009), opinion 
withdrawn and superseded on reh'g, 598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’d 131 S. Ct. 2238 
(2011). 
 
15 See id. 
 
16 Id. at 1263. 
 
17 Id. at 1262. 
 
18 Id. at 1262-63. 
 
19 Id. at 1263.  See generally U.S. Patent No. 5,787,449 (filed June 2, 1994) (illustrating 
Microsoft's '449 patent). 
 
20 Symantec Corp. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, 522 F.3d 1279, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 
21 See i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 847 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. 
granted, 131 S. Ct. 647, 178 L. Ed. 2d 476 (U.S. 2010) and aff’d 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011). 
Disagreeing with Microsoft, the Federal Circuit held that corroborating evidence, while 
required to support testimony alone of any witness to invalidate a patent, was not 
required in response to a claim for patent invalidity.  See id. 
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that a lower standard should apply to allow it to meet the burden of proof 
in light of S4 being destroyed.22 
 
[4] The unusual facts of the i4i case cause a change to the 
preponderance of the evidence standard to seem appealing.  However, bad 
facts make for bad law.  Lowering the standard to address those bad facts 
would damage the patent system and stifle innovation. 
 
[5] First, this paper describes the interests behind the presumption of 
patent validity and the historical treatment of the burden of proof required 
to overcome that presumption.  While precedent does not bind the 
Supreme Court, it is important to consider how and why a particular 
standard has been applied in addition to Congress’s inaction in 
implementing a new standard.  Second, this paper examines arguments in 
support of maintaining the status quo, changing to a preponderance of the 
evidence standard, and adopting a dual standard where some evidence 
must rise to the level of clear and convincing evidence while other 
evidence need only show invalidity by a preponderance of the evidence.  
Finding this dual standard to be impractical, and the broad application of 
the preponderance of the evidence standard to be inappropriate, this paper 
supports the continued broad application of the clear and convincing 
standard along with congressional action to address the unfairness that 
accompanies broad application of that standard. 
 
II. INTRODUCTION TO THE STANDARD OF PROOF PROBLEM 
  
[6] The interests behind the presumption of patent validity provide 
context for the standard of proof issue within the patent system.  This 
section analyzes those interests by examining the application of both the 
clear and convincing standard and the preponderance of the evidence 
standard in various circuit courts before the establishment of the Federal 
Circuit, in the Federal Circuit itself, and the Supreme Court.  The 
historical treatment of the standard of proof reflects the standard’s 
                                                          
22 See i4i, 589 F.3d at 1263. 
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purpose, which although merely persuasive, is significant in light of 
Congress’s refusal to change the standard.23 
 
A. Interests Behind the Standard of Proof 
  
[7] Patents are obtained through an examination process performed by 
the PTO.24  First, an inventor submits an application to the PTO.  Then, a 
PTO examiner evaluates the patentability of the invention and eventually 
allows a patent to issue or issues a rejection.25  An issued patent is entitled 
to a presumption of validity.26  This presumption of validity can only be 
overcome by a showing of clear and convincing evidence.27 
 
[8] Several factors support this heightened standard.  First, the PTO is 
presumed to have thoroughly examined patent applications and to have 
issued valid patents.28  Second, the PTO is the agency that determines 
patent validity, so its decisions should generally preside over a finding of 
invalidity by a non-expert.29  Third, the heightened standard facilitates 
licensing, purchasing, and acquisition of patent rights by increasing the 
                                                          
23 See Kristen Dietly, Lightening the Load: Whether the Burden of Proof for Overcoming 
a Patent’s Presumption of Validity Should be Lowered, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2615, 2651 
(2010).  The Court has not issued any opinions on the appropriate standard of proof to 
overcome the presumption of patent validity that are binding on the Federal Circuit.  See 
id. 
 
24 See 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(1) (2010) (mandating that the PTO “shall adopt and use a seal of 
the Office . . . with which letters patent[s] . . . shall be authenticated”). 
 
25 35 U.S.C. §§ 131-132(a).  
 
26 35 U.S.C. § 282. 
 
27 See, e.g., Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1573 
(Fed. Cir. 1984); Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1360 
(Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 
28 See 35 U.S.C. § 131; Sowa & Sons, 725 F.2d at 1360. 
 
29 See W. Elec. Co. v. Piezo Tech., Inc., 860 F.2d 428, 433 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
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reliability of an issued patent’s validity.30  However, applying a lower 
standard that does not give deference to the PTO would promote 
uncertainty in the enforceability of a patent until it is upheld as valid after 
litigation.  
 
[9] However, a heightened standard for overcoming the presumption 
of patent validity has aspects that make the first two factors suspect.  PTO 
examiners have limited time and resources, particularly due to the high 
volume of incoming patent applications and the large backlog of 
applications.31  Further, PTO examiners are usually not capable of 
evaluating all of the identified prior art references for reasons other than 
time constraints.32  Some prior art is unknown to both the examiner and 
the inventor during examination.33  In uncommon cases with bad facts, 
parties may have, in good faith, destroyed relevant prior art before 
litigation.34 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
30 See Microsoft v. i4i Petitioner and Amici Briefs, OBLON, SPIVAK, MCCLELLAND, 
MAIER & NEUSTADT (Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.oblon.com/blog/donna/2011/02/08/micr 
osoft-v-I4i-petitioner-and-amici-briefs.  
 
31 See Dietly, supra note 23, at 2655; Data Visualization Center, UNITED STATES PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml (last visited 
Jan. 14, 2011) (as of December 2011, 6,652 PTO examiners examined 112,073 
applications in the fiscal year, the backlog of applications waiting to receive a first office 
action tallied 662,457).    
 
32 See Dietly, supra note 23, at 2655 (arguing that examiners have “inadequate access to 
prior art”). 
 
33 See id. at 2643 ( “[T]he examiner’s search for prior art is guided by only what the 
applicant discloses.”).  
 
34 See, e.g., i4i Ltd. v. Microsoft, 598 F.3d 831, 846 (Fed. Cir. 2010) cert granted, 131 S. 
Ct. 647 (2010), aff’d 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011). 
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B.  Background of the Clear and Convincing Standard 
  
[10] Historically, the two most common standards of proof used in civil 
litigation have been applied to overcome the presumption of patent 
validity.35  The clear and convincing evidence standard requires a showing 
that an event is “highly probable,” though it does not quite rise to the level 
of “beyond a reasonable doubt.”36  Alternatively, the preponderance of the 
evidence standard merely requires a showing by more than a fifty percent 
chance.37 
 
[11] The clear and convincing standard has long been the established 
precedent of the Federal Circuit for overcoming the presumption of 
validity.38  Before the establishment of the Federal Circuit, however, 
differing standards were applied across the various courts of appeals.39  
While the decisions of those courts have no binding impact on the Federal 
Circuit or Supreme Court, the reasoning for applying various standards 
provides context for the Federal Circuit’s broad application of the clear 
and convincing standard.  
 
                                                          
35 See Dietly, supra note 23, at 2636, 2640. 
 
36 See Buildex, Inc. v. Kason Indus., 849 F.2d 1461, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citing 
Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984)). 
 
37 See Hodges v. Sec’y of Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 9 F.3d 958, 968 (Fed. Cir. 
1993). 
 
38 See Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1573 (Fed. 
Cir. 1984). 
 
39 Compare Dickstein v. Seventy Corp., 522 F.2d 1294, 1297 (6th Cir. 1975) (adopting a 
preponderance of the evidence standard), and Rains v. Niaqua, Inc., 406 F.2d 275, 278 
(2d Cir. 1969) (applying a preponderance of the evidence standard), with Hobbs v. U.S. 
Atomic Energy Comm’n, 451 F.2d 849, 856 (5th Cir. 1971) (applying a clear and 
convincing evidence standard), and Universal Marion Corp. v. Warner & Swasey Co., 
354 F.2d 541, 544 (10th Cir. 1965) (applying a clear and convincing evidence standard). 
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[12] Some circuit courts have applied a heightened burden of proof.40  
For example, the Ninth Circuit held that a patent’s presumption of validity 
could only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence.41  The Ninth 
Circuit went on to state that the presumption of validity is based on the 
“expertness of the Patent Office acting within a specific field . . . .”42  The 
Tenth Circuit also applied the clear and convincing evidence standard.43  
To overcome a patent’s presumption of validity, the Fifth Circuit required 
a “quantum of proof” greater than a mere preponderance of the evidence.44  
The Fifth Circuit stated that the clear and convincing evidence standard 
and the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard both satisfy this extra 
“quantum of proof.”45  The Eighth Circuit required a showing of 
“substantial evidence” to overcome the presumption of validity.46  Later, 
the Eighth Circuit characterized both substantial evidence and clear and 
convincing evidence as comparably heavy burdens of proof.47 
 
[13] In contrast, some courts merely required a showing by a 
preponderance of the evidence to overcome a patent’s presumption of 
validity.48  For example, the Second Circuit stated that the presumption of 
validity did not have “independent evidentiary value” and could be 
overcome by “a preponderance of the evidence.”49  The Fourth Circuit 
                                                          
40 See, e.g., Moon v. Cabot Shops, Inc., 270 F.2d 539, 541 (9th Cir. 1959). 
41 Id. 
 
42 Id. 
 
43 Universal Marion Corp. v. Warner & Swasey Co., 354 F.2d 541, 544 (10th Cir. 1965). 
 
44 Hobbs v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 451 F.2d 849, 856 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 
45 Id. 
 
46 L & A Prods., Inc. v. Britt Tech Corp., 365 F.2d 83, 86 (8th Cir. 1966). 
 
47 Clark Equip. Co. v. Keller, 570 F.2d 778, 795 n.17 (8th Cir. 1978). 
 
48 See, e.g., Rains v. Niaqua, Inc., 406 F.2d 275, 278 (2d Cir. 1969). 
 
49 Id.  
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explicitly rejected an argument that a defendant must overcome a 
presumption of validity beyond a reasonable doubt.50  The Fourth Circuit 
applied a preponderance of the evidence standard.51  
 
[14] Despite the lack of consensus among courts regarding which 
standard should be applied to overcome the presumption of patent validity, 
courts have applied the same standard in cases where a prior art reference 
had not been previously considered by the PTO.52  When dealing with 
such cases, courts required no more than a mere preponderance of the 
evidence and some removed the presumption of validity altogether.53  In 
explaining why the heightened standard was not appropriate in those 
cases, the Fifth Circuit stated that the PTO’s expertise, which was the 
reason behind affording deference in the first place, was irrelevant because 
the agency had not considered the prior art.54 
 
                                                                                                                                                
 
50 Universal Inc. v. Kay Mfg. Corp., 301 F.2d 140, 148 (4th Cir. 1962). 
 
51 Id.  
 
52 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 22, Microsoft Corp. v. z4 Techs., Inc., No. 07-
1243 (U.S. Mar. 31, 2008), 2008 WL 877886 at *22.  For further discussion, see Dietly, 
supra note 23, at 2644. 
 
53 See Plastic Container Corp. v. Cont’l Plastics of Okla., Inc., 708 F.2d 1554, 1558 (10th 
Cir. 1983); Turzillo v. P & Z Mergentime, 532 F.2d 1393, 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1976); 
Futorian Mfg. Corp. v. Dual Mfg. & Eng’g, Inc., 528 F.2d 941, 943 (1st Cir. 1976); Alcor 
Aviation, Inc. v. Radair Inc., 527 F.2d 113, 115 (9th Cir. 1975); U.S. Expansion Bolt Co. 
v. Jordan Indus., 488 F.2d 566, 569 (3d Cir. 1973); Ralston Purina Co. v. Gen. Foods 
Corp., 442 F.2d 389, 390 (8th Cir. 1971); Eisele v. St. Amour, 423 F.2d 135, 138-39 (6th 
Cir. 1970); Formal Fashions, Inc. v. Braiman Bows, Inc., 369 F.2d 536, 539 (2d Cir. 
1966); Heyl & Patterson, Inc. v. McDowell Co., 317 F.2d 719, 722 (4th Cir. 1963). 
 
54 See Baumstimler v. Rankin, 677 F.2d 1061, 1066 (5th Cir. 1982).  The Eleventh 
Circuit agreed with this reasoning.  See Mfg. Research Corp. v. Graybar Elec. Co., 679 
F.2d 1355, 1364 (11th Cir. 1982). 
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[15] When the Federal Circuit was established in 1982, it chose not to 
adopt a standard of proof from any particular circuit.55  Instead, the 
Federal Circuit adopted the law of the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals and the U.S. Court of Claims as precedent in its first decision.56  
Historically, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals required a showing 
of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption of patent 
validity, regardless of whether the evidence had been previously 
considered by the PTO.57  In its first year, however, the Federal Circuit 
declined to adopt a “particular standard of proof [as] necessary to reach a 
legal conclusion,” holding that standards of proof “relate[] to specific 
factual questions.”58  The court expanded upon its position in 1983, stating 
that while a standard of proof “relates [not] to legal presumptions, but to 
facts,” a party seeking to overcome the presumption of validity must do so 
by a showing of “clear and convincing evidence.”59  In 1984, the Federal 
Circuit concluded that prior art not considered by the PTO did not face a 
different presumption or burden of proof than previously considered prior 
art.60  The court required a showing of clear and convincing evidence in 
all cases to overcome a patent’s presumption of validity.61  The Federal 
Circuit did not clarify why it applied the clear and convincing standard so 
broadly.62  The court continued to broadly apply the clear and convincing 
standard to patent invalidity challenges.63  
                                                          
55 S. Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982). 
 
56 Id. 
 
57 See Solder Removal Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 582 F.2d 628, 632 (C.C.P.A. 
1978).  For further discussion, see Dietly, supra note 23, at 2648-49. 
 
58 SSIH Equip. S.A. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 718 F.2d 365, 375 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 
59 Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 
60 Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 
1984) (citing Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng’g Labs., Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 8 (1934)). 
 
61 Id. at 1360. 
 
62 See id. at 1359-60. 
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[16] In contrast to the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court has not 
definitively identified a particular standard of proof.64  Before the i4i case, 
the Supreme Court had not directly addressed the burden of proof required 
to overcome the presumption of patent validity.65  However, in KSR 
International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., the Court noted, in dicta, that when the 
PTO had not considered prior art, the justification for applying a 
heightened standard based on the PTO’s expertise is largely eliminated.66  
The i4i case gave the Court an opportunity to resolve the controversy 
surrounding the appropriate standard of proof necessary to overcome the 
presumption of patent validity. 
 
III. MICROSOFT CORP. V. I4I LTD. PARTNERSHIP 
  
[17] i4i owns the '449 patent,67 which claims a novel way of “editing 
custom XML, a computer language.”68  i4i sued Microsoft for 
                                                                                                                                                
 
63 See, e.g., Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1573 
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (finding that in challenges to patent validity, the party “attacking validity 
has the burden of proving invalidity by clear and convincing evidence”). There is at least 
one instance where the court applied a lower standard for a validity issue.  B. D. Daniel, 
Heightened Standards of Proof in Patent Infringement Litigation: A Critique, 36 AIPLA 
Q.J. 369, 394 n.136 (2008) (citing Environ Prods., Inc. v. Furon Co., 215 F.3d 1261, 
1266 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that the correct standard of proof of priority in invention 
for co-pending patents is by a preponderance of the evidence). 
 
64 Dietly, supra note 23, at 2651. 
 
65 The Supreme Court addressed the standard of proof for determining inventorship, but 
this determination is distinct from the determination of patent invalidity.  Radio Corp. of 
Am. v. Radio Eng’g Labs., Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1934). 
 
66 550 U.S. 398, 426 (2007). 
 
67 Method and Sys. for Manipulating the Architecture and the Content of a Document 
Separately from Each Other, U.S. Patent No. 5,787,449 (filed June 2, 1994) (issued July 
28, 1998). 
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infringement of the '449 patent, citing use of the claimed invention in 
certain versions of Microsoft Word.69 
 
[18] In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Texas, a jury concluded that the '449 patent was not invalid and that the 
patent was infringed by Microsoft.70  The district court stated that 
Microsoft bore the high burden of proving patent invalidity by a showing 
of “clear and convincing evidence,” which the jury found Microsoft had 
failed to meet.71  The Federal Circuit affirmed the findings of the district 
court.72  Before the district court, Microsoft argued that the '449 patent 
was invalid because it was anticipated by the sale of a program known as 
S4.73  S4 was developed and sold by i4i early enough to trigger the on-sale 
bar under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).74  However, i4i destroyed S4 in good faith 
before litigation and the PTO never considered it.75  Because there was no 
dispute that S4 is prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), the argument focused 
                                                                                                                                                
68 i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 839-40 (Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’d, 131 S. 
Ct. 2238 (2011).  Specifically, the invention separates tags, referred to as “metacodes,” 
from the content within computer code.  Id.  Separation of the metacodes from the 
content of a document or webpage allows for a user to change the language of the content 
without editing the metacodes, and to view the content as one document.  Id. at 840.  The 
separated metacode and content documents can be independently edited and then put 
back together via a “metacode map.”  Id.  
 
69 Id. at 839. 
 
70 i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 670 F. Supp. 2d 568, 573 (E.D. Tex. 2009), aff'd as 
modified, 589 F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2009), opinion withdrawn and superseded on reh’g, 
598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011). 
 
71 Id. at 584, 608. 
 
72 i4i Ltd. P'ship, 598 F.3d at 864. 
 
73 Id. at 846-47. 
 
74 Id. at 846. 
 
75 Id. 
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on whether Microsoft adequately proved that S4 employed the “metacode 
map” limitation claimed in the '449 patent.76  Since S4 was destroyed, 
corroborating testimony of S4’s creators with independent evidence 
became a large issue.77  
 
[19] Microsoft presented testimony of a co-inventor, a former i4i 
employee, because it lacked other evidence of S4’s coding and 
capabilities.78  Microsoft did not have evidence to corroborate the alleged 
co-inventor’s testimony.79  Microsoft contended that if i4i had not 
destroyed S4 before litigation, it could have presented the corroborating 
evidence required to meet this heightened standard.80  Microsoft did not 
corroborate the alleged co-inventor’s testimony and could not meet the 
clear and convincing standard.81  
 
[20] Microsoft argued that the district court erred in its application of 
the clear and convincing standard and stated that the burden of proof 
should have been a preponderance of the evidence.82  When the Federal 
                                                          
76 Id. at 846-47. 
 
77 See i4i Ltd. P'ship, 598 F.3d at 846-47. 
 
78 See id. at 847-48. 
 
79 Id. 
 
80 i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 589 F.3d 1246, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2009), opinion 
withdrawn and superseded on reh’g, 598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 
2238 (2011). 
 
81 See i4i Ltd. P'ship, 598 F.3d at 848; cf. Symantec Corp. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 
522 F.3d 1279, 1295-96 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  Although Microsoft contends that it needed 
corroborating evidence to meet the clear and convincing standard, the Federal Circuit 
disagreed.  The court held that corroborating evidence, while required to support 
testimony alone of any witness to invalidate a patent, was not required in response to a 
claim for patent invalidity.  See i4i Ltd. P'ship, 598 F.3d at 847. 
 
82 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12-13, i4i Ltd. P’ship, 598 F.3d 831 (No. 10-290), 
2010 WL 3413088 at *14-15. 
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Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to apply the clear and 
convincing standard, Microsoft petitioned the Supreme Court for 
certiorari.83 
 
[21] At the Supreme Court, Microsoft continued to argue that the Patent 
Act did not support the clear and convincing standard.84  Countering 
Microsoft’s argument, i4i cited Congress’ refusal to change the standard 
and the need to defer to the expertise of the PTO.85  The Supreme Court 
decided to maintain the broad application of the clear and convincing 
standard.86  However, the Court’s reasoning to arrive at that conclusion is 
suspect.  Section III explores the analysis that the Court should have made. 
 
IV. THREE SCENARIOS TO CONSIDER WHEN DETERMINING  
THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF PROOF FOR BROAD APPLICATION 
 
[22] When determining which standard of proof for overcoming a 
patent’s presumption of validity is appropriate for broad application, 
separating the analysis into three types of scenarios provides clarity.  First, 
the clear and convincing evidence standard should apply when the PTO 
has previously considered the prior art reference in question.  Second, the 
clear and convincing evidence standard should also apply when prior the 
PTO does not previously consider prior art references in question and 
some post-grant review is available for consideration.  Third, the 
preponderance of the evidence standard is fairer when the PTO did not 
previously consider the prior art reference in question and some post-grant 
review to consider this art is unavailable.  
 
 
                                                          
83 See generally i4i Ltd. P’ship, 598 F.3d at 864; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, i4i Ltd. 
P’ship, 598 F.3d 831 (No. 10-290). 
 
84 Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2247-48 (2011). 
 
85 Id. at 2252.  
 
86 Id.  
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A. Previously Considered Prior Art 
  
[23] In litigation where the alleged infringer asserts patent invalidity 
based on evidence that was previously reviewed by a PTO examiner, a 
showing of clear and convincing evidence is the appropriate standard of 
proof for overcoming a patent’s presumption of validity.87  As the expert 
agency in determining patent validity, the PTO’s decisions should be 
given deference.88  Expert agencies are awarded deference for other 
determinations, such as statutory interpretation under Chevron.89  Also, 
business transactions, such as licensing, purchasing, and acquisition of 
patent rights, rely heavily on the strong presumption of an issued patent’s 
validity that accompanies the clear and convincing standard.90  Without 
the heightened standard of proof, the enforceability of a patent would 
remain questionable until litigation.91  Under a lower standard, those 
business transactions would be largely disrupted.92  In this scenario, 
                                                          
87 See Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng’g Lab., Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 2 (1934); Price v. 
Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1191-92 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 
88 See W. Elec. Co. v. Piezo Tech., Inc., 860 F.2d 428, 433 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (explaining 
that a patent examiner’s decisions are given presumptive correctness because he is a 
“quasi-judicial official”). 
 
89 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 
(1984) (declaring that reviewing courts will accept an agency’s reasonable interpretation 
of ambiguous statutes);  Chen, supra note 12, at 1181-86 (2008) (arguing for Chevron 
deference to apply to patent claim construction, giving deference to the PTO when 
interpreting claims). 
 
90  Brief for International Business Machines Corporation as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Neither Party at 15-16, Microsoft, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (No. 10-290), 2011 WL 343072 at 
*15-16.  
 
91 See Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of 
Validity, 60 STANFORD L. REV. 45, 52, 58 (2007). 
 
92 See Microsoft v. i4i Petitioner and Amici Briefs, OBLON, SPIVAK, MCCLELLAND, 
MAIER & NEUSTADT (Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.oblon.com/blog/donna/2 
011/02/08/microsoft-v-i4i-petitioner-and-amici-briefs. 
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arguments center on awarding Chevron deference, the constitutional basis 
for applying a standard other than the default preponderance of the 
evidence standard for civil cases, and public policy.93  As the expert 
agency, the PTO should be trusted to do its job.94  Expert findings have 
appropriately been given special treatment in other areas.95  
 
[24] Although different than determinations of patent validity, Chevron 
deference is awarded to expert agencies for statutory interpretation.96  
Chevron deference bases judicial review of agency statutory 
interpretations upon “a range of reasonable interpretations, rather than a 
single prescriptive meaning.”97  When applying Chevron deference, a 
reviewing court applies a two-step analysis.98  First, the court looks to 
whether the plain language of a statute is ambiguous.99  If the statute is 
unambiguous, the court should apply the unambiguous meaning as 
directed by Congress.100  Second, if the statute is ambiguous, the court 
examines whether the agency’s interpretation was reasonable.101  If an 
                                                          
93 See Chen, supra note 12, at 1185-86.  
 
94 Moon v. Cabot Shops, Inc., 270 F.2d 539, 541 (9th Cir. 1959) (supporting this notion); 
see also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 426 (2007) (noting that in cases 
where the PTO had not considered prior art, the justification for the application of a 
heightened standard on the basis of the PTO’s expertise is largely eliminated). 
 
95 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 
(1984) (declaring that reviewing courts will accept an agency’s reasonable interpretation 
of ambiguous statutes). 
 
96 See id. 
 
97 Chen, supra note 12, at 1181. 
 
98 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. 
 
99 Id. at 842-43. 
 
100 Id.  
 
101 Id.  
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agency defines an ambiguous statutory term in a reasonable way, the 
reviewing court must uphold the agency’s interpretation.102  It is 
reasonable to apply Chevron deference to other areas as well for reasons 
such as the access to experts and other resources, maintaining the 
separation of power between branches of government, “improv[ing] the 
quality of agency proceedings . . . and encourag[ing] clearer 
draftsmanship.”103 
 
[25] For the same reasons104, deference to the PTO should be given in 
the i4i v. Microsoft case.  First, the PTO certainly has more expertise than 
the courts in evaluating prior art and determining patent validity.105  
Regardless of a particular examiner’s technical background, the expertise 
of the PTO resides in the authority vested in an examiner’s 
appointment.106  Second, applying Chevron deference in this situation 
maintains a separation between the judiciary and executive branch by 
preventing courts from interfering with “administrative agencies’ 
policymaking responsibilities.”107  The PTO is the designated agency for 
determining patentability and issuing patents.108  Congress did not direct 
                                                          
102 See id.; Chen, supra note 12, at 1182. 
 
103 Chen, supra note 12, at 1181–85 (2008). 
 
104 Id. 
 
105 Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who's Afraid of the APA? What the Patent 
System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 316 (2007). 
 
106 See W. Elec. Co. v. Piezo Tech., Inc., 860 F.2d 428, 433 (Fed. Cir. 1988) 
(“Furthermore, questions that might discredit an examiner are irrelevant because it is not 
the particular examiner’s expertise that gives the decisions presumptive correctness but 
the authority duly vested in him by his appointment as a patent examiner.”). 
 
107 Chen, supra note 12, at 1183.  
 
108 35 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1) (2006). 
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that role to the judiciary.109  As such, the PTO should fulfill its role as the 
primary issuer of patents while the courts should enforce issued patents.  
 
[26] Though they carry little weight, there are four reasons why the 
PTO’s decisions of patent validity are not a traditional fit for receiving 
Chevron deference.  First, the PTO does not generally engage in either 
informal rulemaking or formal adjudication, which are two proceedings 
that merit deference.110  While engaging in those proceedings would 
strengthen the argument for receiving Chevron deference, a failure to do 
so does not foreclose it.111  Second, examiners are usually hired for their 
technical training rather than legal training.112  While not all agencies are 
comprised of legal experts, PTO examiners’ lack of formal legal training 
guides against granting deference.113  However, Congress has directed the 
PTO to have the primary role for determining patent validity.114  To fulfill 
                                                          
109 See id. 
110 Chen, supra note 12, at 1189 (quoting Benjamin & Rai, supra note 105, at 297). 
 
111 Benjamin & Rai, supra note 105, at 298. 
 
112 See Patent Examiner Positions - View Jobs, UNITED STATES PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF., http://www.usptocareers.gov/Pages/PEPositions/Jobs.aspx (last visited Nov. 18, 
2011) (“Basic qualifications for Patent Examiners include United States citizenship and a 
minimum of a bachelor’s degree in physical sciences, life science, engineering discipline 
or computer science.”). 
 
113 Chen, supra note 12, at 1189; cf. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman 
II), 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996) (“The construction of written instruments is one of those 
things that judges often do and are likely to do better than jurors unburdened by training 
in exegesis.”).  However, it is important to consider that agencies need not be comprised 
of legal experts.  See e.g., Opportunities for College and Grad School Graduates, 
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/careers/gra 
dopp.html#college (last visited, Nov. 30, 2011) (“The ECP seeks graduates with a 
bachelor’s or higher level degree in a variety of academic disciplines, including physical 
and life sciences, business, finance, computer sciences, policy and public 
administration”). 
 
114 35 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1) (2006). 
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that role, PTO examiners are not required to have legal expertise.115  
Rather, examiners require technical skills to understand and differentiate 
inventions from the prior art.116  Third, PTO determinations of patent 
validity are often made based on incomplete information such as missing 
prior art.117  In this scenario, however, this reason is irrelevant because the 
PTO made an informed decision based on prior art that it reviewed.118  
Finally, deference may not be appropriate because PTO proceedings are 
generally ex parte in nature.119   
 
[27] Although PTO proceedings are generally ex parte in nature, 
examiners are neutral in their analysis of patent validity as mandated by 
the PTO.120  Examiners are trained to analyze prior art and issue rejections 
if necessary.121  Also, patents are usually issued after receiving at least one 
rejection.122  Since the PTO has been given the role of the primary issuer 
                                                          
115 See Patent Examiner Positions, supra note 112.  
 
116 See General Requirements Bulletin for Admission to the Examination for Registration 
to Practice in Patent Cases Before the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 
UNITED STATES PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., (Feb., 2011), http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards 
/oed/grb.pdf.  
 
117 Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting that 
there is nearly always “pertinent” and “relevant” prior art that is unconsidered by the 
PTO). 
 
118 i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 589 F.3d 1246, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2009), opinion 
withdrawn and superseded on reh'g, 598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2238 
(2011). 
 
119 Chen, supra note 12, at 1190. 
 
120 See id. at 1168, 1190. 
 
121 Patent Examiner Training, UNITED STATES PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., 
http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2004/0602_patexamtrain.jsp (last modified July 
4, 2009, 1:22 PM). 
 
122 Christopher A. Cotropia et. al, Do Applicant Patent Citations Matter? Implications for 
the Presumption of Validity 11, (Stanford Law and Econ. Olin, Working Paper No. 401, 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology     Volume XVIII, Issue 2 
 
 21 
of patents and because it has the capacity to fulfill this role, especially 
when it has previously considered the prior art in question, the PTO’s 
decision to issue a patent should be given deference by the courts.  While 
the PTO’s decisions of patent validity may not fit the traditional mold to 
receive Chevron deference, these factors are unconvincing to prevent 
receiving such deference.  
 
[28] Another argument against applying the clear and convincing 
standard is Congress’ failure to address whether a heightened standard of 
proof should apply.  In civil suits, the party bearing the burden of proof 
may overcome that burden by a preponderance of the evidence, unless 
important liberty interests are at stake or Congress has heightened the 
standard.123  Congress specified the presumption of validity, but was silent 
as to the standard of proof for overcoming that presumption.124  However, 
stating that there is a presumption of patent validity only to set the burden 
at the default preponderance of the evidence standard would be 
superfluous.  Arguably, the presumption was only identified because the 
burden of proof changed.  Furthermore, Congress has had many 
opportunities to change the Federal Circuit’s broad application of the clear 
and convincing standard, but has failed to do so.125 
 
[29] The next argument turns on public policy.  Microsoft and several 
others contended that applying the heightened clear and convincing 
standard stifles innovation because it provides too much protection for 
                                                                                                                                                
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1656568 (“Applicants submitted 23,664 of 
the 32,180 prior art references cited in patents with at least one prior art-based rejection, 
or 73.5%.”). 
 
123 See, e.g., Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991). 
 
124 See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2010) (identifying who bears the burden of proof on invalidity, 
but saying nothing about the evidentiary standard for meeting that burden of proof). 
 
125 See generally 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2010) (identifying who bears the burden of proof on 
invalidity, but saying nothing about changing  the evidentiary standard for meeting that 
burden of proof). 
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invalid patents and simultaneously lowers patent quality.126  If the PTO 
incorrectly issues a patent, the heightened standard of proof makes it more 
difficult to prove that the patent is invalid.  Proponents of this argument 
contend that the issuance of invalid patents is a major problem, and cite a 
lack of full knowledge of the prior art, time, and resources among PTO 
examiners as reasons why the PTO issues invalid patents.127  However, 
these public policy concerns are unpersuasive when considering the patent 
system as a whole. 
 
[30] Lowering the standard to preponderance of the evidence and taking 
away the deference given to PTO decisions on patent validity will not 
promote patent quality.128  In fact, taking away the deference given to the 
PTO would effectively shift the task of ultimately determining patent 
validity from the PTO to the courts.129  With this lower standard, alleged 
infringers would probably challenge the validity of patents more 
frequently because courts could disregard the PTO’s validity decision.130  
The PTO would only serve as an initial filter to patentability, and validity 
would remain suspect until upheld by a court.  Such a system would 
                                                          
126 See Taylor, supra note 118, at 312-313. 
 
127 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966); Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, 
Intellectual Property, Competition, and Information Technology 31-33 (UC Berkeley 
Competition Policy Ctr., Working Paper No. CPC04-45, 2004), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=527782. 
 
128 Brief for International Business Machines Corporation as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Neither Party, supra note 90, at 13. 
 
129 Michael J. Shuster et. al, Altering Patent Suit Proof Burden Would Chill Innovation,19 
WASH. LEGAL FOUND., no. 7,  2004, at 4, available at http://www.fenwick.com 
/docstore/477/Altering_Patent.pdf; Biotechnology Indus. Org., Response to the Federal 
Trade Commission’s Patent System Reform Recommendations, 4 (Apr. 26, 2004), 
http://www.bio.org/sites/default/files/ResponsetoFTCPatReformrecommendations.pdf. 
 
130 See Stephen E. Noona, U.S. Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Challenge to Burden of 
Proof Standard for Invalidity, INSIDE BUS.: THE HAMPTON ROADS BUS. J., (Dec. 7 2010), 
http://www.insidebiz.com/blogs/kaufman-canoles/us-supreme-court-agreeshearchallenge-
burden-proof-standard-invalidity. 
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provide little incentive to improve the quality of patent examination 
because the quality of that examination would not influence the likelihood 
of a patent being held valid in court.131  Instead of increasing innovation, 
lowering to the preponderance of the evidence standard may ultimately 
lead to lower patent quality, greater uncertainty of patent rights, and 
increased litigation.132   
 
[31] There is also a significant reliance on issued patents being upheld 
as valid.133  Reliance on the current standard of proof for business 
decisions makes the prospect of changing the standard of proof disturbing 
for the stability of the entire patent system.134  Businesses have made 
strategic decisions about licensing rates and whether “to bring, defer, 
pursue, or settle infringement lawsuits” based on the clear and convincing 
standard.135  In essence, investments in companies are based on the 
heightened standard.136  Clients decide whether to launch new product 
lines by relying on legal opinions of patent attorneys who based their 
opinions on that heightened standard.137  Changing the standard of proof 
                                                          
131 See Etan S. Chatlynne, Note, The Burden of Establishing Patent Invalidity: 
Maintaining a Heightened Evidentiary Standard Despite Increasing “Verbal Variances”, 
31 CARDOZO L. REV. 297, 320 (2009) (stating that lowering to a preponderance of the 
evidence standard to overcome patent invalidity would weaken patents and increase 
associated litigation). 
 
132 See id. 
 
133 See, e.g., Adam B. Jaffe & Josh Lerner, Innovation and Its Discontents, 1 CAPITALISM 
& SOC’Y, Issue 3, Art. 3, at 22 (2006) (“Uncertainty is the enemy of investment . . . 
[E]liminating the presumption of validity is [thus] a potentially dangers change in terms 
of . . . innovation.”); see also Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984). 
 
134 See Jaffe & Lerner, supra note 133, at 51. 
 
135 Brief for International Business Machines Corporation as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Neither Party, supra note 90, at 15. 
 
136 Id. 
 
137 Id. 
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for overcoming patent validity disrupts the foundation on which these 
decisions were made and would significantly disrupt the U.S. economy.138  
The heightened burden increases the incentive for inventors to engage in 
substantial research and development and to disclose their inventions in 
pursuit of patents rather than keep their innovations hidden as trade 
secrets.139  In situations where the PTO has previously considered the 
prior art in question, the clear and convincing standard should apply. 
 
B. Prior Art Not Previously Considered Where  
PTO Reexamination Is an Option 
 
[32] In litigation where the alleged infringer asserts patent invalidity 
based on evidence that was not reviewed by a PTO examiner, but that 
could have been the basis for a reexamination proceeding, the clear and 
convincing evidence remains the appropriate standard.  Applying the 
heightened standard encourages the use of reexamination proceedings 
while allowing parties to choose to litigate.140  Congress created 
reexamination proceedings as a cheaper and more efficient alternative to 
litigation.141  Courts should allow the means provided by Congress to 
serve their intended purpose. 
 
                                                          
138 See, e.g., AIPLA Response to the October 2003 Federal Trade Commission Report, 
AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N 6 (Apr. 21, 2004), http://www. 
aipla.org/advocacy/executive/Documents/ResponseToFTC.pdf; Biotechnology Indus. 
Org., supra note 129, at 4–5 (estimating the potential effect of lowering the standard on 
the biotechnology industry). 
 
139 Richard S. Gruner, Better Living Through Software: Promoting Information 
Processing Advances Through Patent Incentives, 74 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 977, 1012-13 
(2000). 
 
140 See Alan W. Kowalchyk & Joshua P. Graham, Patent Reexamination: An Effective 
Litigation Alternative?, 3 LANDSLIDE, no. 1, 2010 at 2, available at 
http://www.merchantgould.com/CM/Articles/Kowalchyk_LANDSL IDE.pdf. 
 
141 See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 4 (1980) (predicting that reexamination would 
require “a fraction of the time” of litigation). 
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[33] A reexamination proceeding allows the PTO to reevaluate new 
evidence that raises a substantial new question of patent validity.142  
Congress created the reexamination proceedings to act as a faster and 
more cost efficient alternative to litigation.143  There are several factors 
that make it a preferred option, including timing, the applicable standard 
of proof, the ability to amend claims, and reliance on an expert agency.144 
 
[34] First, the timing with which reexamination may be brought 
forward is flexible.145  Reexamination can be requested by anyone at any 
time.146  Judges retain discretion over delaying litigation until a 
reexamination proceeding concludes.147  Their discretionary power should 
not be used suspend litigation for a party who is simply seeking to delay 
litigation proceedings, or after the parties have invested significant time 
and resources into the litigation.  However, a party seeking to use 
reexamination proceedings instead of litigation should be allowed to do 
so, and even incentivized to do so, so long as they file a request for 
reexamination in a timely manner.  
 
                                                          
142 R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 16:71 (4th ed.). 
 
143 See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307, supra note 141. 
 
144 Cf. id. at 3. 
 
145 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2006). 
 
146 Id. 
 
147 See, e.g., Xerox Corp. v. 3Com Corp., 69 F. Supp. 2d 404, 406 (W.D.N.Y. 1999), 
appeal dismissed, 243 F.3d 554 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  In determining whether to delay 
litigation, courts consider whether the associated delay “would unduly prejudice” the 
party not requesting the delay, whether the delay will “simplify the issues in question and 
trial of the case,” and whether “discovery is complete and whether the trial date has been 
set.”  Id. at 406-07.  The closer to trial, the less likely a delay for reexamination will be 
granted.  Id. at 407.  If a trial date is already set, a requesting party must generally show a 
“clear case of hardship or inequity” to delay the trial.  Id. at 407. 
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[35] Second, reexamination proceedings apply the preponderance of the 
evidence standard.148  Therefore, parties have the option of meeting the 
heightened burden within the courts or the preponderance of the evidence 
standard in a reexamination proceeding.149  If courts applied the 
preponderance of the evidence standard, there would be no point in having 
reexamination proceedings because deference would not be given to PTO 
decisions as discussed in the previous subsection.  Third, reexamination 
allows for invalid claims to be narrowed, if appropriate, rather than to be 
completely destroyed as required by litigation.150  Because a claim can be 
narrowed, the PTO has more discretion to reward innovation and 
invalidate protection for non-innovation.  Fourth, reexamination directs 
decisions of patentability to the PTO.151  Congress designated the PTO as 
the expert agency to serve as the primary issuer of patents.152  Because of 
these distinctions, reexamination should be preferred over litigation for 
those wishing to challenge patent validity. 
 
[36] Reexamination is not without its faults.  It takes time, usually two 
to three years on average.153  Additionally, the patent holder may file an 
appeal with the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, thereby adding 
another two to three years on average, followed by the possibility of an 
                                                          
148 See In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing In re Caveney, 761 
F.2d 671, 674 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 
 
149 Id. 
 
150 35 U.S.C. § 305 (2006). 
 
151 See, e.g., In re Swanson, 540 F.3d at 1374.  
 
152 See 35 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1) (2006); discussion supra Part III(a).  
 
153 See UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, EX PARTE REEXAMINATION 
FILING DATA (2011), available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/EP_quarterly_report 
_June_2011.pdf; UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTER PARTES 
REEXAMINATION FILING DATA (2011), available at http://www.uspto.gov/pat 
ents/IP_quarterly_report_June_2011.pdf. 
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appeal to the Federal Circuit.154  However, litigation takes time too.  
Congress created the reexamination proceedings to provide a more 
efficient alternative to costly and lengthy litigation.155  As such, a clear 
and convincing evidence standard should be applied when reexamination 
is available.  Different arguments are applicable for other types of prior 
art, which do not allow for reexamination. 
 
C. Prior Art Not Previously Considered Where  
PTO Reexamination is Not an Option 
 
[37] In litigation, where the alleged infringer asserts patent invalidity 
based on evidence that was not reviewed by a PTO examiner, and could 
not have been the basis for a reexamination proceeding, the preponderance 
of the evidence standard is fairer than the clear and convincing standard.  
In this scenario, applying the clear and convincing standard gives 
deference to decisions that the PTO did not make because the prior art 
reference in question was not considered before the patent was granted 
and could not be considered post-issuance.  Applying this heightened 
standard leads to circumstances where a party challenging patent validity 
is unable to meet the heightened standard through no fault of its own, as 
was the case in Microsoft.156 
 
[38] Unlike the other two scenarios, public policy does not support a 
heightened standard here.  There is less reason to give such deference to 
the PTO when it had not, and could not, evaluate the new prior art.157  In 
this scenario, reexamination is not available, therefore litigation is the only 
                                                          
154 See 35 U.S.C. § 306 (2006); Brad Pedersen, Polishing a Diamond in the Rough: 
Suggestions for Improving Inter Partes Reexaminations, 91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 422, 422 n.3 (2009). 
 
155 See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307, supra note 141. 
 
156 See generally Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011). 
 
157 See id. at 2251 (“Simply put, if the PTO did not have all material facts before it, its 
considered judgment may lost significant force.”). 
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avenue to overturn the PTO’s decision because Congress has provided no 
alternatives.158  Consequently, when the PTO is unavailable, no expert 
agency is better suited to evaluate a patent’s validity than the court.159  
These reasons, while compelling, are not sufficient to warrant the broad 
application of the preponderance of the evidence standard. 
 
[39] While Microsoft could not meet the heightened standard because 
the S4 program had been destroyed prior to litigation, this is an 
uncommon circumstance.160  In many cases, when prior art has been 
destroyed, courts will look for inequitable conduct or litigation 
misconduct.161  When prior art has not been destroyed, corroborative 
evidence is, or should be, available.  A broad change in the standard of 
proof to overcome patent invalidity, solely based on bad facts of an 
uncommon situation, as in the Microsoft case, would cause more harm 
than good in the patent system by upsetting the balance of interests in 
more common situations. 
 
[40] For the above reasons, broad application of the clear and 
convincing standard is appropriate in most cases, but fails to provide 
adequate opportunity alleged infringers to defend themselves in situations 
where reexamination by the PTO is unavailable under the Patent Act. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
158 See 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2006) (showing the lack of alternatives to litigation).  
 
159 Cf. Dickenson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 164 (1999). 
 
160 See generally i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 589 F.3d 1246, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2009), 
opinion withdrawn and superseded on reh'g, 598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’d, 131 S. 
Ct. 2238 (2011).  
 
161 See e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Mobil Oil Corp, No. H-96-3795, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
17555, at *66-82 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 1998) (highlighting the requirements of an 
inequitable conduct defense). 
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V. THE DUAL STANDARD, WHILE THE MOST FAIR STANDARD,  
IS IMPRACTICAL 
 
[41] A dual standard provides a more equitable solution than either the 
preponderance of the evidence standard or the clear and convincing 
evidence standard alone.  The dual standard would apply a preponderance 
of the evidence standard when dealing with new prior art that is not 
eligible for reexamination.  The clear and convincing evidence standard 
would serve as the burden of proof to overcome prior art previously 
considered by the PTO as well as new prior art that is eligible for 
reexamination.  The dual standard would be the fairest way to address the 
various scenarios previously discussed.  However, the dual standard would 
be impractical for three reasons.  First, requiring jurors to keep track of 
two standards regarding prior art would cause confusion and make the two 
standards ineffective.162  Second, litigation would inappropriately hinge on 
whether a particular prior art reference was “considered” by the PTO, 
which raises additional concerns about how to appropriately define 
“considered.”163  Finally, the dual standard might overwhelm the PTO by 
incentivizing a flood of prior art from applicants.164  As a result, a dual 
standard should not be adopted. 
 
[42] First, the dual standard, though fairer than either standard alone, 
would likely confuse jurors.165  Patent cases are already difficult for juries 
to understand based on the complex nature of the cases themselves.166  
                                                          
162 Brief for International Business Machines Corporation as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Neither Party, supra note 90, at 21.  
 
163 Id. at 20. 
 
164 Id. at 22.  
 
165 Id. at 21. 
 
166 Mary M. Calkins et al., Bearing Witness: Court-Appointed Experts in Patent Cases, 
LAW TECH. NEWS (Feb. 16, 2010),  http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/P 
ubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1202443308577&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1; see, e.g., Comaper 
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Jurors struggle to keep track of multiple standards in patent cases.167  For 
instance, the clear and convincing evidence standard is applicable to 
showing patent invalidity, whereas the preponderance of the evidence 
standard is applicable for determining whether infringement occurred.168  
Varying standards of proof for a single determination are also difficult for 
jurors to define and quantify.169  Adding yet another standard of proof to 
address patent invalidity based on certain prior art will only increase juror 
confusion.  If the two standards were blurred together due to confusion, 
some of the deference given to the PTO may be taken away or 
magnified.170  For these reasons, jury confusion would likely make the 
dual standard impractical. 
 
[43] Second, the dual standard also focuses the litigation away from the 
differences between the prior art and the invention.  Rather, the focus 
becomes directed at whether the PTO examiner has previously evaluated 
the prior art, in addition to whether the prior art is eligible for 
reexamination.  This shift in focus will likely increase the time and cost of 
                                                                                                                                                
Corp. v. Antec, Inc., 596 F.3d 1343, 1354-55 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (vacating the lower court’s 
decision because the jury’s verdicts represented an “irreconcilable inconsistency”).  
 
167 Brief for International Business Machines Corporation as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Neither Party, supra note 90, at 21  (stating that infringement issues are evaluated using a 
preponderance of the evidence standard while patent validity employs a clear and 
convincing evidence standard). 
 
168 Id. 
 
169 See Jane Goodman, Jurors’ Comprehension and Assessment of Probabilistic 
Evidence, 16 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 361, 364-66 (1992-1993) (providing an extensive 
discussion on the difficulty that jurors have quantifying the different standards of proof in 
probabilistic quantities). 
 
170 See Brief for Biotechnology Industry Organization as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 5, Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011) (No. 10-
290), 2011 WL 1059617 at *5. 
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litigation.171  Furthermore, determining what constitutes “considered” 
prior art presents new issues of its own.172  
 
[44] Prior art is referenced throughout a patent’s examination.173  An 
applicant discloses some prior art references in an Information Disclosure 
Statement.174  Depending on the number of references included in the 
Information Disclosure Statement, a PTO examiner may be unable to 
realistically “consider” them all.175  PTO examiners also find and consider 
prior art references during patent examination.176  As an application goes 
through an examination, the examiner discusses some prior art references 
at length while others are merely mentioned.177  Also, an examiner will 
have certain background knowledge or be aware of pertinent teachings 
                                                          
171 See David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 
96-97 (1983) (stating that the more complex a lawsuit is, the more time and cost will be 
involved in litigation).  
 
172 See Solder Removal Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 582 F.2d 628, 633 n.9 (C.C.P.A. 
1978) (“It has been pointed out that a mere failure to cite certain prior art does not 
necessarily mean it was no considered by the examiner, who may have considered it 
unworthy of citation.”). 
 
173 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.104 (2011); M.P.E.P. § 707.05. 
 
174 See M.P.E.P. § 704.12(a) (2006); M.P.E.P. § 704.14(d) (2006); PTO Form 1449. 
 
175 See  H.R. Rep. No. 107-120 at 2 (2001) (“It has also lead to abuse by patent agents 
and lawyers who are gaming the system . . . [by] include[ing] hundreds of prior art 
references, knowing that the PTO examiner has only a few precious hours to review the 
application before she is required to make a decision on its grant.”).  See generally Fiscal 
Year 2010 USPTO Workload Tables, available at http://www.uspto.gov 
/about/stratplan/ar/2010/oai_0 6_wlt_00.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2011). 
 
176 See M.P.E.P. § 1302.12 (2006); PTO Form 892. 
 
177 Brief of Amicus Curiae for International Business Machines Corporation in Support of 
Neither Party, supra note 88, at 19. 
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from prior art that may be “considered” but not listed as prior art on any 
form during patent examination.178 
[45] Even if all listed prior art is deemed “considered” for these 
purposes, it is still difficult to determine how thoroughly the examiner 
read, evaluated, and applied a particular reference.179  Each action by an 
examiner would have to be adequately defined and quantified.  As an 
examiner goes through examination, each action would have to be taken 
and documented, presumably slowing productivity.  Addressing issues as 
to the thoroughness of an examination may also complicate and delay 
litigation.  Further, PTO examiners would not be particularly helpful 
during litigation to resolve the issue because they cannot be compelled to 
disclose their “mental processes” at trial regarding a decision on a patent 
application.180  The issues raised in determining whether a prior art 
reference has been “considered” make the impracticality of a dual standard 
more apparent.  
 
[46] Third, adopting a dual standard may overly encourage applicants to 
flood the PTO with prior art references.181  The current system requires an 
applicant to disclose relevant prior art of which the applicant is aware.182  
                                                          
178 See id.; cf. Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1983) 
(noting that there is almost always “pertinent” and “relevant” prior art that is apparently 
unconsidered by the PTO). 
 
179 Brief for International Business Machines Corporation as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Neither Party, supra note 90, at 19-20. 
 
180 See, e.g., id. at 20 (citing W. Elec. Co. v. Piezo Tech., Inc., 860 F.2d 428, 431 (Fed. 
Cir. 1988) (stating that as a general rule, a “patent examiner cannot be compelled to 
testify regarding his ‘mental processes.’”). 
 
181 See Brief for International Business Machines Corporation as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Neither Party, supra note 90, at 22; Brief for Genentech, Inc. as Amici Curiae 
in Support of  Respondents at 27-28, Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 
(2011) (No. 10-290), 2011 WL 994261. 
 
182 See Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Servs., Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348, 
1351 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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While an applicant must disclose relevant prior art, there is no obligation 
and limited incentive to extensively search for prior art or to submit 
irrelevant prior art to the PTO.183  However, patent applicants would want 
the clear and convincing standard to be applied and a dual standard would 
encourage them to disclose as much prior art as possible to the PTO.184  
Increased disclosure of prior art to the PTO is not necessarily bad.  
However, extensive disclosure of irrelevant prior art references would be 
distracting and wasteful of the PTO’s already limited resources.185 
 
[47] There are two possible solutions to turn this from a potentially 
negative factor into a positive factor.  First, placing a limit on the total 
number of prior art references that a patent applicant can submit would 
improve the quality of the submitted references.  The limit should be 
based on the invention’s area of technology and include other factors such 
as foreign filing.  It is crucial that a limit be set that appreciates increased 
disclosure of prior art while deterring extensive disclosure of irrelevant 
prior art.  By limiting the number of references that an applicant can 
submit, there is an incentive to submit the most on-point references over 
irrelevant prior art.  Second, adding a fee per reference will help alleviate 
the additional burden placed on the PTO to keep up with the flood of 
references.  Essentially, an applicant would be paying for an examiner’s 
time to sift through all of the disclosed prior art references.  As certain 
patents may be worth paying a high amount to list hundreds of prior art 
references, these two solutions preferably operate together.  With 
applicants submitting increased relevant prior art and PTO examiners 
having additional resources, a potentially negative factor could result in 
higher quality patent examination. 
 
                                                          
183 Id. 
 
184 Brief for International Business Machines Corporation as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Neither Party, supra note 90, at 22. 
 
185 See H.R. REP. NO. 107-120, at 2 (2001) (stating that there was abuse by patent agents 
and attorneys who include an overwhelming number of prior art references in their 
applications knowing that the PTO examiner cannot consider all of them). 
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[48] Based on the resulting juror confusion, inappropriate focus on 
whether prior art has been “considered,” and flooding of prior art sent to 
the PTO, applying a dual standard is not practical.  While it is the fairest 
balance of interests, a broad application of the clear and convincing 
evidence standard coupled with congressional changes over what qualifies 
for PTO reexamination is a more practical solution. 
 
VI. THE SUPREME COURT CORRECTLY MAINTAINED THE 
STATUS QUO, BUT RE-OPENED THE DOOR FOR CONCERN 
WITH JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
 
[49] The Supreme Court correctly affirmed the broad application of the 
clear and convincing standard; however, it opened the door to a dual 
standard based on its jury instruction.186  In support of its decision, the 
Court addressed Microsoft’s two main arguments.187  First, Microsoft 
contended that the clear and convincing standard has no congressional 
authority because Congress did not specify it in the Patent Act and there 
are no significant liberty interests involved.188  Second, Microsoft argued 
that the preponderance of the evidence standard should be applicable 
where the prior art in question was not before the PTO during the 
examination process.189  
 
[50] The Supreme Court held that there was congressional authority for 
the clear and convincing standard.190  In reaching that conclusion, the 
                                                          
186 Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2251 (2011). 
 
187 See generally id. at 2244. 
 
188 See Brief for Petitioner, Microsoft, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (No. 10-290), 2011 WL 288890 at 
*8; see also Microsoft, 131 S. Ct. at  2244-45. 
 
189 Id. at 2244. 
  
190 See id. at  2244-49. 
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Court looked to § 282 of the Patent Act of 1952.191  While it did not 
explicitly state the clear and convincing standard of proof, § 282 featured 
distinctive common law terms, including the term “presumed valid.”192  
Without express direction from Congress, those terms retain their common 
law meaning.193  Citing Radio Corp. of America v. Radio Engineering 
Laboratories, Inc., where the Court implemented a high standard for 
determining inventorship, the Court found that the clear and convincing 
standard had been long established in the common law for determining 
questions of patent validity.194  For purposes of identifying the standard of 
proof, the Supreme Court did not distinguish between determining 
inventorship and questions of patent invalidity.195  
                                                          
191 See generally Microsoft, 131 S. Ct. at 2242-43 (2011) (describing § 282 of the Patent 
Act of 1952). 
 
192 Id. at 2245 (citing Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 58 (2007)). 
 
193 Id.  
 
194 Id. at 2245-46 (citing Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng’g Labs., Inc., 293 U.S.  2, 7-8 
(1934)). 
 
195 Cases dealing with questions of inventorship are distinct from those determining 
patent invalidity.  When evaluating inventorship, a court must determine who was 
involved in the creation of, and usually who owns rights in, the invention.  In Morgan v. 
Daniels, the Court characterized a case disputing the true inventor of a patent as putting 
aside the PTO’s conclusions, which could not occur by a mere preponderance of the 
evidence.  153 U.S. 120, 122-24 (1894).  Later, in another case disputing inventorship, 
the Court held that a patent’s presumption of validity may not be overcome except by a 
showing of “clear and cogent evidence.” Radio Corp. of Am., 293 U.S. at 1, 2 (1934).  
The Court based its conclusion on its recognition that the requirement of a heavy burden 
of proof was a central truth among the cases rather than on giving deference to the PTO 
as the Federal Circuit did in American Hoist.  Compare Radio Corp. of Am., 293 U.S. at 
7-8, with Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1984).  Alternatively, 
when evaluating patent invalidity, the Supreme Court has not clearly articulated the 
standard of proof prior to the present case.  In fact, the various courts of appeals prior to 
the establishment of the Federal Circuit were split on the appropriate standard, as some 
courts gave deference to the PTO because the expert agency was presumed to have done 
its job, while others declined to give such deference, especially for art that was not 
previously considered by the PTO.  See supra note 61; discussion supra Part I. 
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[51] Next, the Court addressed whether a different standard should 
apply when the PTO has not previously considered prior art.196  Again, the 
Court looked to what Congress had established and pre-1952 cases such as 
Radio Corp. of America.197  Section 282 codified the common law 
presumption of patent validity.198  The clear and convincing standard was 
implicitly codified with the presumption of validity.199  Nothing in § 282 
suggests a divergence from that meaning.200  There is certainly no 
indication that Congress intended to establish a dual standard in which 
some prior art is evaluated using the clear and convincing standard while 
other prior art is considered on the preponderance of the evidence 
standard.201  While the Court acknowledged pre-1952 courts of appeals 
cases that featured a lower standard when prior art was not considered 
previously by the PTO, it refused to imply that Congress’s Patent Act 
included that lower standard.202  Rather, it held that those cases reflected 
the Federal Circuit’s principle that new evidence of patent invalidity may 
“carry more weight” than previously considered evidence.203  The burden 
of proof remains the same, though the newly considered prior art can 
significantly help a challenge to a patent’s validity.204 
                                                          
196  Microsoft, 131 S. Ct. at 2249. 
 
197 See id. at 2249-50. 
 
198 Id.  
 
199 Id. 
 
200 Id. at 2250.  See generally 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006). 
 
201  Microsoft, 131 S. Ct. at 2250-51. 
 
202 Id. 
 
203  Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2251 (2011) (citing Am. Hoist & 
Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). 
 
204 Id.  
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[52] The Court also briefly touched upon various policy arguments and 
concluded that the Federal Circuit has applied the same heightened 
standard of proof for nearly thirty years, while Congress, who has often 
amended § 282, has not once even considered lowering the standard of 
proof.205  Congress has expanded re-examination proceedings to provide 
for inter partes proceedings to address policy concerns over issuing “bad” 
patents.206  Any further changes to the common law presumption of 
validity and accompanying standard of proof, which were codified in § 
282, should only be made at Congress’s discretion.207 
 
[53] Though there is room to question the Supreme Court’s reasoning, 
it arrived at the correct result to maintain the status quo.208  The Court’s 
statements addressing the policy arguments were dead on.  It is for 
Congress to act to change the well-established heightened burden of proof 
regarding questions of patent validity.209  While this is the correct 
conclusion at law, the Court provided further instruction that may 
effectively employ a dual standard.210  Unfortunately, the Court stated that 
an available and appropriate means for giving new prior art additional 
weight is through jury instruction.211  According to the Court, a jury may 
be instructed to consider that particular prior art has not previously been 
considered by the PTO, that it is disputed whether the prior art presented 
before the jury is identical to what was presented to the PTO, or that new 
                                                          
205 Id. at 2252. 
 
206 Id. 
 
207 Id. at 2252. 
 
208 See Microsoft, 131 S. Ct. at 2252. 
 
209 Id. at 2252. 
 
210 See id. at 2250-51. 
 
211 Id. 
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evidence is “materially new.”212  The Court then stated that Microsoft had 
failed to request such an instruction and that it was too late in litigation to 
do so.213  So, the clear and convincing standard broadly applies when 
determining questions of patent validity, and a jury instruction may be 
used to highlight that certain prior art references were not previously 
considered by the PTO to provide those references with more weight.214 
 
[54] To reiterate the harmful effects of the dual standard, it will likely 
confuse jurors, distract the focus of litigation, and flood the PTO with 
prior art.215  Here, the jury instruction distinguishes between prior art that 
was previously considered and not previously considered by the PTO.216  
Such a distinction is intended to maintain the same standard for all prior 
art while giving more weight to prior art that has not previously been 
considered.217  This distinction works in theory.  Jurors would hear one 
standard of proof, the clear and convincing standard, followed by a jury 
instruction reminding them that certain prior art has not been considered 
by the PTO.  However, the jury instruction is more likely to result in jurors 
employing a dual standard.  Even worse, jurors might employ a standard 
less than the clear and convincing standard out of confusion.  Though the 
law has not changed, the risks presented by the dual standard remain.  
 
[55] Consider the potential impact of a jury instruction in Microsoft.  
Because Microsoft did not corroborate the alleged co-inventor’s 
                                                          
212 Id. at 2251. 
 
213 Microsoft, 131 S. Ct. at 2251. 
 
214 See id. at 2250-51. 
 
215 See discussion supra Part IV. 
 
216 Microsoft, 131 S. Ct. at 2251. 
 
217 Id. 
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testimony, it could not meet the clear and convincing standard.218  As the 
Supreme Court articulated, the standard does not change.219  Rather, prior 
art not previously considered by the PTO carries more weight.220  
Regardless of the weight given to prior art, Microsoft needed 
corroborating evidence to meet the heightened standard.221  If correctly 
applied, the jury instruction would have had no effect because the 
available evidence could not meet the clear and convincing standard.222  
Any other application of the jury instruction would have diluted the 
heightened standard into one that could be overcome without 
corroborating evidence because more weight would be given to prior art 
that had not previously been considered.  Jurors are generally not legal 
scholars.  Thus, the jury instruction provides a potentially devastating 
source of confusion.  The only way Microsoft could have proven that the 
‘449 patent was invalid was with a lower standard of proof.  Microsoft’s 
attorneys were already able to emphasize to the jury that the PTO had not 
previously considered certain prior art references.223  The jury instruction 
suggested by the Court is unwarranted and potentially harmful because it 
invites the jury to practically apply a dual standard.  
 
[56] Bad facts make bad law.  The Court did well to maintain the status 
quo despite these facts.224  Rather than attempting to address these unusual 
facts with a jury instruction, the Court should have heeded its own advice 
                                                          
218 See id. at 2247-48; see also Symantec Corp. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 522 F.3d 
1279, 1295-96 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 
219 Microsoft, 131 S. Ct. at 2251 (citing Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 
725 F.2d 1350, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). 
 
220 Id. 
 
221 See id. at 2247-48; see also Symantec Corp., 522 F.3d at 1295-96. 
 
222 See Microsoft, 131 S. Ct. at 2247-48. 
 
223 Id. at 2251. 
 
224 Id. at 2252. 
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and allowed Congress to make the changes necessary to address these 
circumstances.  Even with the jury instruction, however, Congress can still 
act to address concerns with the broad application of the clear and 
convincing standard, namely expanding reexamination to include all 
challenges to patent validity.  Congress needs to take such action to 
prevent bad facts from being used to make bad law. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
[57] Courts should continue to broadly require a showing of clear and 
convincing evidence to overcome a patent’s presumption of validity.  This 
heightened standard gives deference to the PTO as the expert agency and 
enables business owners to rely on a patent’s presumption of validity in 
making business decisions.  Lowering the standard to preponderance of 
the evidence would be inappropriate when prior art has been previously 
considered by the PTO or when reexamination is available.  This is 
because it eliminates the deference to the PTO, which businesses rely 
upon when making decisions.  Despite unique situations where the PTO 
has not previously considered prior art and reexamination is unavailable, 
the clear and convincing standard should still be broadly applied.  Courts 
should not be compelled by unique facts, like those in Microsoft, to 
employ a dual standard where some evidence must rise to the level of 
clear and convincing while other evidence need only show invalidity by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Such a dual standard would result in juror 
confusion, direct the focus of litigation on whether the PTO had 
previously considered prior art, and encourage applicants to flood the PTO 
with prior art.  Further, changing the standard of proof for overcoming a 
patent’s presumption of patent validity is a decision for Congress rather 
than the courts.  Therefore, courts should continue to broadly apply the 
clear and convincing standard to challenges of a patent’s presumption of 
validity. 
 
[58] The Court did well to maintain the status quo despite the 
compelling facts in Microsoft.  Unfortunately, the Court approved of a 
potential jury instruction to identify prior art that had not been previously 
considered by the PTO.  Such a jury instruction would practically 
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implement a dual standard or dilute the clear and convincing standard into 
a lower standard of proof.  The Court should have stopped after holding 
the clear and convincing standard as the appropriate standard of proof for 
broad application.  Creating ways to address bad facts, like those in 
Microsoft, is a job for Congress.  Courts should broadly apply the clear 
and convincing standard to challenges of a patent’s presumption of 
validity.  To do otherwise in light of bad facts allows bad facts to make 
bad law. 
